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ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLEES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SMITH'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ARISING 
OUT OF THE ARIZONA TAX REFUND. 
A. The Law of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Utah. 
Appellees misinterpret the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law. 
They would like the Court to believe that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may 
only be breached by showing evidence that Appellees acted "unreasonably or in "bad 
faith." However, to prevail on a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, Smith is not required to show that the breaching party acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the parties, particularly those vested with 
discretion over the other under terms of a contract, to exercise that discretion reasonably 
and in good faith. Cook v. lions First Natl Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah 1996). The 
Appellees flip this rule to mean that Smith must show that the Appellees acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith. This logic does not follow the rule. It is not a sufficient 
defense that Appellees did not intentionally or purposely engage in unreasonable or bad 
acts. In other words, because a person does not act reasonably or in good faith does not 
mean that they acted "unreasonably" or in "bad faith." Again, this distinction is subtle, 
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but significant.1 Instead, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the 
party exercising discretion under a contract do so "for any purpose-including ordinary 
business purposes-reasonably within the contemplation of the parties." Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center v. Smiths Food and Drug Centers, 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The Olympus Hills court continues, "[a] contract thus would be breached by a 
failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the 
contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach." 
Id. citing RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt.a (1979). ("[g]ood faith 
performance of enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with justified expectations of the other party"). In his decision 
on this motion, Judge Mclff rejected Appellees' interpretation of the law, and instead 
relied on the law stated above. (Rec. at 1719-1720). 
Furthermore, Utah courts have embraced §205 of the Restatement. See, e.g., St. 
Benedicts Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 1994, 2000 (Utah 1991). 
The covenant requires honesty in fact. §205 Comment a (1981). In some instances, it 
may require more than honesty. Id., Comment d. Appellees did not act honestly, and 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, when they pocketed the tax refund 
without even disclosing it to Smith. 
throughout their brief, Appellees argue that there is no evidence that they purposely 
acted "unreasonably" or in "bad faith." Therefore, it is important for the Court to recognize 
Appellees' flaw in the interpretation of the law of good faith and fair dealing. 
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B. There is No Accord and Satisfaction. 
Appellees argue that the refund claim was not an asset at the time, and therefore 
any "discussion" would have been meaningless. To prevail on the claim of the existence 
of an accord, the moving party must show "(1) an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute 
over the amount. . ." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000) citing 
Marion Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985). There could not have 
been an accord and satisfaction on the Arizona Tax Refund because the issue was simply 
not discussed nor contemplated when the settlement documents were prepared and 
executed. Appellees point to no evidence in the record to the contrary. The trial court 
relied on the this fact in finding no accord. (Rec. at 2015). When the Arizona Tax 
Refund was finally discovered and the refund materialized, Appellees' only response was 
to pocket the money. Regardless, the accord and satisfaction defense are objectionable 
on other grounds discussed below. See II.A. Infra. There being no accord, the issue is 
ripe for consideration at trial. 
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Was Never 
Terminated. 
Appellees argue that the implied covenant does not survive the termination of the 
contract. They cite the case Republic Group as legal authority. However, Appellees 
misinterpret the court in Republic Group, which simply said that in order for there to be a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, there must be a some type of preexisting 
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contractual relationship. See Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door, Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 
289-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) citing Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) 
(where the actual existence of a contract was in dispute). Obviously, in the present case, 
Smith and Appellees had a preexisting contractual relationship as evidenced by the Buy-
Sell Agreement and the termination papers. Therefore, Appellees are incorrect in 
assuming that the covenant cannot survive the contact. Regardless, the contract was 
never terminated as Appellees argue. 
The tax refund was paid while Smith was still receiving payments under the note 
and buyout agreement. Furthermore, the Appellees argue that because the tax refund was 
"beyond the fixing of values" in 1992 there is no sound basis to distinguish this particular 
accounting matter from the other accounting entries at issue. Appellees are incorrect to 
assume the refund is "beyond the fixing of values." In his affadavit, Smith's accounting 
expert states that the generally accepted accounting principles require the accountant to 
record the tax refund directly to equity as a "prior period adjustment." (Rec. at 1000). As 
such, generally accepted accounting principles require the consideration of the portion of 
the tax refund that would have been in existence in June of 1992 as part of the equity as 
of June 1992. (Rec. at 1000). Appellees cannot escape their duty under the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and pocket the admitted windfall they received Therefore, 
because the covenant of good faith existed just the same in 1995 when Appellees 
pocketed the tax refund, as it did in 1992 when Smith executed the buyout documents, the 
trial court's judgment should be upheld. 
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D. The Trial Court's Reasoning for Imputing the Tax Attorney's 
Knowledge on the Corporation is Sound. 
Appellees then play possum in attempt to keep their admitted windfall by 
claiming that if the tax attorney's knowledge is imputed to the corporation, then it is 
imputed to Smith. As the trial court suggested, their argument is flawed. (Rec. at 2019, 
fn. 2). It is undisputed that at the time Smith signed the termination papers in July 1992, 
neither Smith, nor the corporate officers, were aware of the tax refund claim was being 
purposely kept alive by the corporation's counsel. It is further undisputed that at a 
subsequent point the corporate officials became aware of and cooperated with the effort 
to obtain and retain the refund. At that time, Smith was no longer working for GCE, but 
instead, was in an adversarial setting. Therefore, as the trial court suggested, "to suggest 
that he should be treated as a corporate official in this context flies in the face of reason." 
Id. ("the corporation stood to gain everything and [Smith] nothing by keeping the refund 
effort alive and by secreting it from [Smith]. This is exactly what happened."). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE TESTIMONY OF 
SMITH'S EXPERT DERK RASMUSSEN. 
Appellees argue that Rasmussen's testimony should be excluded because it is 
"unreliable" and "irrelevant." However, Appellees stretch the standard for admitting 
expert testimony in Utah beyond its legal limits in an attempt to fit it around their 
arguments. The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under 
5 
this standard, the appellate cannot reverse a decision to exclude expert testimony unless 
the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
Appellees' arguments claiming Rasmussen's various statements and opinions are 
unreliable and irrelevant do not "exceed the limits of reasonability." Therefore, they are 
best suited for trial and have no place in the realm of admissibility. Besides, their alleged 
discrepancies and claims that Rasmussen's opinions are "irrelevant and unreliable," are 
substantially based on Appellees' deposition in a cross-examination setting. They do not 
go to the admissibility of evidence, but instead the weight to be given by the trier of fact. 
The cross-examination tactics Appellees attempt to use to show that Rasmussen's 
opinions are "irrelevant" and "unreasonable" are material issues of fact to be determined 
by a jury. A review of the evidence clearly shows Rasmussen's opinions are founded on 
undisputed accounting expertise and grounded in applicable industry standards and 
customary practice. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellees' motion to strike 
the testimony of Rasmussen on summary judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLEES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN HOLDING THE INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES 
LIABLE. 
In their brief, Appellees first argue that the issue of whether the trial court failed to 
dismiss the individual Appellees is a "ruling of law," which should be "reviewed for 
correctness," without an deference to the trial court, (p.3). They then argue "the court 
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found that since [GCE] was a privately held, Subchapter S coiporation, it would not 
dismiss the individual Appellees." (p.65). Finally, the Appellees argue that under Utah 
law, an individual cannot be held liable for a breach of a corporation's contracts, absent 
exigent circumstances that do not exist in this case. However, it appears all three of these 
assertions are incorrect. 
While normally corporate shareholders are insulated from a corporation's 
liabilities, Utah courts have developed a two part test for determining when disregarding 
the corporate from is justified: 
"[I]n order to disregard the corporate entity, there must be a concurrence of 
two circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership 
that the separate personalities of the coiporation and the individual no 
longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one of a few 
individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a 
fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow" 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis added). Courts have held that the alter ego theory is a discretionary remedy 
that will only be reversed on appeal if there is an abuse of discretion. See Envirotech 
Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d487, 501 (Utah App. 1994). The abuse of discretion 
standard of review requires appellate to "presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
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properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddardv. Hickman, 
685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). 
Therefore, the only way the appellate court can overturn this ruling is if the record 
"clearly shows" the trial court's discretion was improper. As long as there is sufficient 
evidence upon which the trial court made its finding, its decision should be upheld. Here, 
the trial court judge apparently invoked the equitable alter-ego doctrine in his decision 
not to dismiss the individual Appellees. However, the trial court judge also stated that "it 
was established at oral argument that GCE is a subchapter S, closely held corporation and 
that virtually all of the refund monies have been distributed to the small group of 
shareholders who are remaining Appellees" (Rec. at 714). In other words, the court did 
not rely solely on the corporation's form in maintaining the claims against the 
individuals, but also on the manner in which the corporate funds were handled by the 
individual Appellees. Therefore, using its discretion, the court decided it was equitable to 
hold the individual Appellees liable. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
SMITH'S EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS ON THE THEORY OF 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Smith claims his termination from Grand Canyon Expedition's employ was both 
wrongful and constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The court below dispensed with these employment-related claims by concluding that an 
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accord was reached. (Rec. at 807-815). Therefore, the summary judgment order relating 
to this claim is only sustainable if this Court affirms there is (1) a valid accord and 
satisfaction; and, (2) that there are no issues of fact as to whether an accord exists. 
A, Appellees Failed to Plead Accord and Satisfaction as an Affirmative 
Defense, 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8(c), which Appellees failed to plead as such. The court therefore erred by 
relying on the defense of accord and satisfaction in dismissing Appellant's employment-
related claims. Appellees' excuses for failing to affirmatively pleading accord and 
satisfaction are based on incorrect assumptions and procedurally invalid. 
First, Appellees allude to an agreement with Smith's prior counsel as a reason for 
not affirmatively pleading the defense of accord and satisfaction. Smith's prior counsel 
did not consent to the defense of accord and satisfaction. Therefore, Appellees should 
have first raised this defense in an answer and not before. Second, Appellees contend 
that they may proceed because Appellant consented to the defense in connection with 
their motion for summary judgment. As a preliminary matter, the Rules require the 
defense to be raised in the answer, not in connection with a motion for summary 
judgement. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). Further, Smith never consented to allow Appellees to 
use the defense without first raising it affirmatively in their opposition to the motion for 
summary judgement. Again, Appellees point to no evidence in the record to the contrary 
because none exist. In addition, the Appellees argued "waiver" not accord and 
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satisfaction in their motion for summaiy judgment. How could Smith's counsel have ever 
responded to an issue that was not even clearly raised? Instead, the trial court raises the 
defense of accord sua sponte in its decision on Appellees' first motion for summary 
judgment. (Rec. at 810). Finally, the case law relied on by Appellees is simply not 
applicable because it involves amendments to conform to evidence at trial. See Poulsen 
v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah 1983) (the Court's analysis relates to Utah R.Civ. P. 
15(b) involving amendments to conform to evidence in trial); See also, Jones v. Dutra 
Const Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 411, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Lancaster v. C.F. & I Steel 
Corp., 548 P.2d 914, 916 (Colo. 1976). For these reasons, Appellees should not be 
allowed to hold onto this defense, and the trial court erred in allowing it as the basis for 
his decision. 
B. Material Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether an Accord and Satisfaction 
Exist And/Or Waiver Are Present. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment of the employment-related 
claims because whether the parties reached accord and satisfaction is a question of fact. 
See R.A. Reither Const, Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass % 680 P.2d 1342 (Col. App. 
1984); Employers Workers' Compensation Ass yn v. W.P. Industries, 925 P.2d 1225 
(Okl.App. 1996). In addition, Appellees' argument that Appellant waived any claims he 
had when he signed the "termination documents" is a highly fact-dependent question and 
should not be disposed on a summary judgment order. See Olympus Hills Shopping 
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Center, Ltd. v. Smiths Food King and Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 461 (Utah App. 
1994); citing Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988). 
There are not sufficient facts that an accord was reached between the parties, or 
that Smith waived or released any of his claims. Therefore, the order of the court below, 
dismissing Smith's claims under his employment-related claims should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. To prevail on the claim of the existence of an accord, the 
moving party must show " . . . (2) payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute 
. . ." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000) citingMarton 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985). The payments made to Smith 
were not final or offered, accepted, and agreed upon by parties as a full resolution and 
satisfaction of the disputed claim. Appellee argues that no written agreement or specific 
language is required to show an accord and satisfaction. Nevertheless, the evidence does 
not support the conclusion that Smith accepted payments as a discharge of his original 
agreement with Appellees. There is no language in the Separation Agreements indicating 
that it was made in full satisfaction of all claims. 
Waiver is the intentional relinguishment of a known right. Soters, Inc. v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 857 P.2d 935, 939-940 (Utah 1993); citing Reese v. 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991). Any waiver "must be 
distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Id. citing Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 
61 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1936). This reiteration of the Phoenix statement was to insure 
"that waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly 
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intended." Soters, Inc, at 940. There is not language in the July 25, 1992 Agreement and 
Resignation adequate to provide as a matter of law a waiver or release of any claims that 
Smith may have had at the time. 
Appellees admit as much, and focus on the point that waiver can be implied from 
the conduct of the parties. They argue that intent to relinguish a right can be implied if 
the parties conduct "'unequivocally evinces[s] an intent to waive or [is] at least... 
inconsistent with any other intent/" Becksteadv. Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 133 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). However, Appellees point to no evidence, other than the express 
Agreements Smith signed at his forced departure where the Court could "unequivocally" 
imply that Smith relinguished his rights. 
In fact, the express language in the "Agreement" Appellees prepared is hard 
evidence that the a waiver of any claims arising from Smith's employment was never 
implied. Appellees apparently knew what was required to articulate a waiver because 
paragraph 9 on page 3 of the "Agreement" Appellees state "[t]he corporation hereby 
waives any right to enforce the provisions of the covenant not to compete set out in 
paragraph II.2 'Non-Competition of the Employment Agreement executed by Smith on 
November 29, 1986 in favor of the corporation . . . ." However, no such language exists 
in either agreement distinctly manifesting Smith's waiver of any claims arising from his 
employment by GCE, or of any other nature. 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court judge based his decision on the fact 
that the claim had been subject to an accord and satisfaction. However, as discussed 
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above, the trial court erred for a number of reasons in this conclusion. First, as a matter 
of procedure, the Appellees should not have been allowed to use the defense because they 
failed to raise it affirmatively as the rules require. Second, accord and satisfaction is a 
question of fact. From a reading of both parties' briefs it is obvious that there is a factual 
dispute as to whether an accord and satisfaction exist. Third, neither an accord and 
satisfaction, or any other relinguishment of rights, is present. 
Finally, the trial court acknowledged that issues of material fact existed regarding 
the remainder of the employment issues. First, the trial court correctly admits that the 
trier of fact may conclude from the evidence and permissible inferences that the terms of 
the written contract were perpetuated with the consent of both parties. (Rec. at 812). 
Second, the trial court admits that the determination of whether sufficient indicia of an 
implied in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for the jury. (Rec. at 811). Finally, the 
trial court concludes that issues of material fact exist regarding whether or not the 
Appellees had cause to terminate Smith. (Rec. at 28). Therefore, the order of the trial 
court dismissing Smith's claims under his employment agreement should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
II THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR BREACH 
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE CALCULATION OF GCE'S NET BOOK 
VALUE. 
A. Appellees Breached Covenant When They Calculated the Net Book 
Value at the Time of Smith's Forced Buyout 
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Appellees argue that they could not breach the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when calculating the net book value at the time of Smith's departure because 
there is no evidence of intent or bad faith by Appellees. As mentioned at the outset of 
this brief, Appellees misinterpret the law of good faith and fair dealing. See L.A. L Supra. 
As previously mentioned, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires adherence 
to an agreed common purpose consistent with justified expectations of the parties. 
RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt.a (1979). The parties' reasonable 
expectations of the net book value in the event of a forced buyout is the correct issue of 
fact in dispute. 
Both the underlining court and the Appellees mis-characterize the issue; therefore, 
it is helpful to provide the Court with some clarity. Judge Mclff was initially correct 
when he recognized that the flexible accounting principles make the calculation of net 
book value analogous to a line rather than a dot on a line. (Rec. at 1718). Therefore, the 
calculation of net book value for tax purposes is one possible point on the line. However, 
the calculation of net book value for purposes of a forced buyout is another point. Both 
may comport with "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP). However, Smith 
argues that the later, rather than the former, more accurately reflects the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in the event of a forced buyout. Therefore, Appellees' 
argument that the accounting comports with "generally accepted accounting principles" is 
not a defense. Judge Mclff agreed that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing may well 
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influence the acceptable position on the line consistent with the reasonable expectations 
of the parties." Id. However, he later loses the issue when he dismisses the claim because 
he finds no evidence that the accounting decisions were influenced by Smith's forced 
exit. This is the point of departure form the issue by the trial court and the Appellees. 
The issue is not so much whether the accounting methodology was influenced by Smith's 
forced departure, but whether the accounting methodology used reflected the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in the event of a forced buyout. After all, the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing requires the parties' actions to be consistent with the agreed 
common purpose of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the other parties to 
the contract. §205, RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS, Comment d (1981). Therefore, the 
correct factual issue is, given the reasonable expectations of the parties, where should the 
net book value position have been on the accounting line in the event of a forced buyout? 
As mentioned in the opening brief, "[g]ood faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive 
concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual 
issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cook v. Zions First Natl 
Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Republic Group Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 
883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994); Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 
380 (Utah App. 1993). Judge Mclff agreed and Appellees do not dispute this rule. (Rec. 
at 2017). The evidence is clear, from the affadavit of Smith's accounting expert, that a 
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dispute as to how the value should have been calculated exists. Again, the dispute is not 
just whether there is evidence that Appellees' accounting methodology was influenced by 
Smith's forced exit, but also, and more pertinent in this appeal, whether Appellees' 
accounting methodology reflected the reasonable expectations of the parties in the event 
of a forced buyout of one of the shareholders. Such is the case in the present 
determination, and because such a determination involves a dispute as to how the 
accounting should have been done at the time of Smith's departure, it is a question of fact 
that should be left to a jury. 
Therefore, Appellees argument that Smith should be "estopped" from arguing 
was done incorrectly because he benefitted from it when he was an employee 
misinterprets the issue. Once again, the implied covenant of good faith requires the 
parties' actions to be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to the contract, RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS, Comment d 
(1981). It is undisputed that the the Buy-Sell Agreement does not expressly address the 
computation or accounting in the event of a shareholder buyout situation. In such case, 
the covenant requires that this decision be made based on the reasonable expectations of 
the parties. Smith argues that it was not within the reasonable expectations of the parties 
that a shareholder would receive a low net book value calculated for the purposes of tax 
liability, instead of in the interest of shareholder value, in the event the shareholder was 
forced to sell his or her ownership. Therefore, Appellees cannot avoid their implied 
duties by claiming estoppel. 
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B. Whether Parties Reached an Accord and Satisfaction and/or Whether 
Smith Waived Any Claims Are Factual Disputes. 
After considering Appellee's Brief, there is still no evidence that at the time 
Appellant negotiated the "termination documents" he had any knowledge sufficient to 
evaluate GCE's unilateral determination of the net book value. The defense of accord 
and satisfaction requires the Appellee to show, among others, an unliquidated claim or a 
bona fide dispute over the amount due. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile 998 P.2d 254, 259 
(Utah 2000) citingMarton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985). 
Without a dispute as to amount, there is no accord and satisfaction defense. Judge Mclff 
acknowledges that the deposition testimony of Appellant shows that Appellant was "not 
versed in the Company's accounting matters and would not have been in a position to 
evaluate the numbers unilaterally supplied." (Rec. at 808). Further, and more 
importantly, there is still no evidence, nor does any exist, that a dispute as to the buyout 
amount existed at this point. Appellees hide this argument with their employment 
termination argument and offer no evidence of any bona fide dispute in regards to the 
calculation of net book value. 
Instead, Appellees take the position that the negotiations surrounding the 
termination of Appellant, including severance pay and waiver of the non-competition 
provisions, indicate an accord. Again, this may be true if Smith realized the low-end net 
book value at the time. However, as mentioned above, Smith did not and could not then 
appreciate that the accounting of the net book value did not fully represent the net book 
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value of GCE in the context of his forced buyout. Therefore, Appellant can not be 
expected to have negotiated away his right to a higher net book value calculation, and the 
evidence supports this conclusion. 
The Appellees then turn around and argue that accord and satisfaction can arise in 
connection with a claim the amount of which is unknown or uncertain. They cite two 
cases as support for this novel proposition. Regardless if these cases are accurately cited, 
the law goes against the grain of the well established law of accord and satisfaction 
espoused by the Court. 
III. SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ANY DAMAGES PROVED AT 
TRIAL. 
Appellees argue that in the event of a remand that Smith may not attempt to 
introduce facts allegedly supporting a claim for punitive damages. This is contrary to the 
trial court's decision and the law. The trial court admitted that "if the trial in this matter 
produces an appropriate foundation [for punitive damages], the Court could always revisit 
this ruling." (Rec. at 2014). Utah Supreme Court has stated that an award of punitive 
damages may be obtained even when not plead and without a formal amendment of 
pleadings. "If plaintiff were able to adduce the necessary foundational evidence at trial, 
she could claim punitive damages under Rule 45(c). . ." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1175, 1181-82 (Utah 1983) (quoting 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart and J. 
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice, % 54.60 at 1212-14 (2d Ed. 1983)). The trial court's 
statements above are consistent with the Court's ruling above, however, its decision to 
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grant Appellee's motion for summary judgment is contradictory. Smith should therefore 
not be precluded from presenting evidence, and if such evidence supports such an award, 
from recovering punitive damages at trial. 
IV, UTAH CASE LAW JUSTIFIES RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR 
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
IN THIS CASE. 
In Appellees' third motion for summary judgment, Judge Mclff acknowledges that 
the Court in Heslop allowed the recovery of attorney fees as consequential damages in 
employment termination cases. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) (Rec. 
at 2013-2012). Appellees argue that Heslop's considerations regarding the vulnerable 
position of discharged employees do not apply in this case. However, by the 
relationship's nature, a clear disparity of strength exists between an employer and an 
employee. This is especially true in regards to the termination of an employee. 
Therefore, Smith had no other option but to file suit to enforce his employment contract 
after his termination and forced buyout of his stock. 
The trial court declined to recognize the controlling law of Heslop because of the 
contemporaneous case Heinz, which limited the recovery of attorney fees for 
consequential damages to third party litigation in an insured-insurer relationship. Collier 
v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) (Rec. at 2013). The Heinz ruled on a separate 
set of facts. The trial court appears to suggest that the Heinz decision reflects the Court's 
policy of limiting the exceptions allowing attorney fees as consequential damages, and 
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looks to this Court to determine whether or not Heslop should be given its full effect. 
(Rec. at 2012-2013). Further, the trial court refuses to recognize controlling case law 
because of the "nature of the limited claim which remains." (Rec. at 2012). However, if 
this Court does not agree in its decision, either in whole or in part, in the limiting of the 
claims by the trial court, the trial court leaves open the possibility of allowing the 
recovery of attorney fees as consequential damages. (Rec. at 2012). Nevertheless, Heslop 
allows for the recovery for attorney's fees in employment termination cases. Therefore, 
the case law and evidence submitted during the summary judgment proceedings in this 
case to the trial court justify allowing Smith's claim for attorney fees as consequential 
damages. 
V. SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE AN 
ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits amendment with leave of court 
and states that "leave shall be freely given when justice requires." In Cheney, the Court 
held that rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims 
fully adjudicated. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) quoting Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211,381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) ("'[the rules of civil procedure] 
must be looked at in light of their even more fundamental puipose of liberalizing both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." See also Johnson 
v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 538-39, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1936) ("[t]he policy of the law 
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is toward liberality in the allowance of amendments and to regard them favorably in order 
that the real controversy between the parties may be presented, their rights determined, 
and the cause decided."); Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 38, 148 P. 452, 457 (1915) 
("Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to the end that cases may be fully and 
fairly presented on their merits.'"). The trial court avoids what it believes is a 
"quagmire" on the necessary element on a claim for unjust enrichment, that there be a 
benefit conferred on one person, in denying Smith's motion for leave to amend the 
complaint to include the claim. (Rec. at 1717). They also suggest the claim can equally 
be made under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Rec. at 1717-18). Smith 
should not be precluded from arguing a viable remedy simply because the court below 
believes there is a potentially equal remedy. As such, justice requires that Smith be 
allowed to amend his complaint to plead the viable claim of unjust enrichment. 
Appellees incorrectly argue that an unjust enrichment claim would be insufficient 
or futile. In fact, Judge Mclff in his decision on Apellees' second motion for summary 
judgment never says that an unjust enrichment claim would likely fail. Instead, he avoids 
what he believes is a "quagmire" on an element, mentioned below, of an unjust 
enrichment claim. See American Towers Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 
1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (Rec. 1717). The first element on an unjust enrichment cause of 
action is that a benefit must be conferred on one person to another. Id. Appellees reason 
that because the refund was not paid by Appellant to GCE, Smith cannot show any 
benefit conferred upon Appellees in connection with Arizona Tax Refund, and therefore, 
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the claim is "futile." However, this element is not remotely "futile," as Appellees 
suggest. It is undisputed that GCE treated the refund as corporate income. (Rec. at 917-
916, Interrogatory No. 9). The refund constitutes an asset developed during Smith's 
ownership of GCE. That value was not included in the determination of his net book 
value in July 1992. Therefore, the refund, as paid and realized, is now a benefit bestowed 
on Appellees at Smith's expense. At the very least, there is factual evidence in dispute as 
to this element that should be determined by a jury in a trial. The court below erred in 
denying Smith's motion for leave to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied Appellees' summary judgment motion on the 
Arizona Tax Refund issue. Appellees breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing when they received the admitted windfall and denied Smith of any share in 
the benefit. 
The trial court properly admitted the testimony of Smith's expert because his 
testimony does not exceed the limits of reasonability and Appellees' contentions are 
better suited for trial. 
The trial court properly denied Appellees' summary judgment motion in holding 
the individual Appellees liable because of the nature of the corporation and the benefits 
they received make it both legal and equitable to prevent them from hiding behind the 
corporate veil. 
However, the trial court improperly granted summary judgement on Smith's 
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employment-related claims because there are both procedural and factual disputes 
regarding accord and satisfaction and Appellees' breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
For similar reasons, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in 
connection with the calculation of net book value. In addition, the trial court and the 
Appellees misconstrue the issue associated with this defense. 
The trial court improperly granted summaiy judgment by denying Smith the 
entitlement to damages proved at trial because Smith may show the necessary evidence at 
trial. Further, the trial court improperly denied Smith's claim for attorney fees because 
this Court's case precedent allows such a recovery. Finally, Smith is entitled to amend 
his complaint to include a claim for unjust emichment because the Rules liberally permit 
amendments when justice requires. 
DATED this \ £ day of November, 2002. 
By: 
1 
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Cross/Appellee 
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